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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAVID W. SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
JOSEPH DeNIRO and HELEN
DeNIRO, his wife; MARY ANN
DeNIRO, Indiv.idually and as Executrix
of the Estate of William DeNiro,
Deceased '
Defendants-Responde nts.

Case No.
12752

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff, David W. Smith, brought this action to
quiet title to certain subdivision lots. Defendant Mary
Ann DeN iro counterclaimed, seeking to quiet title to
the southerly portion of some of the lots, which portion
lies within the banks of the old Gordon Mill Race, and
she also claimed an easement to discharge drainage and
irrigation water into the mill race.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court quieted title to all of the lots in
the plaintiff. Defendant Mary Ann DeNiro appealed
claiming ownership of the southerly portion of Lot 40
and 41 and the southwesterly corner of Lot 42 which
lay within the confines of the old Gordon Mill Race.
On rehearing of this appeal on June 30, 1971, this Court
remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to modify the decree so as to give to Mrs. DeNiro
the southerly portion of Lots 40 and 41 and the southwesterly comer of Lot 42 lying south of the north bank
of the miU race as shown by Exhibit 1-P.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant Smith here seeks to reverse the original
Findings and Decree by the lower court which quieted
title in Mrs. DeNiro in and to the land lying south of
Lot 42.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
After the case was remanded to the District Court
two hearings were held by the Court. The first hearing
was held on August 25, 1971 and the second hearing on
October 18, 1971. Following those hearings the District
Court signed the Amendments to Findings of Fact and
Amendments to Decree Quieting Title (R. 112, 113,
114, 115) which were submitted by counsel for Mrs.
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DeNiro. The description in these amendments followed
along the north bank of the mill race through Lote 40,
41, and 42 in accordance with the opinion of this Court
on rehearing. The description used followed exactly the
survey plat of the plaintiff Smith, (Exhibit 1-P) which
this Court recognized and approved in its opinion on rehearing. Counsel for Smith submitted to the Court a
Motion to Amend Decree ( R. 5) and urged upon the
Court an amended description which would have deviated from the Smith survey, (Exhibit 1-P) and would
have cut down Mrs. DeNiro's ownership in Lots 40 and
41 to approximately ten feet instead of twenty-four feet
as shown by Exhibit 1-P. In this appeal, Smith does not
now question the line which the Court drew but maintains that the area south of Lot 42 which was never involved in the appeal should not have been quieted in
Mrs. DeNiro since it is a piece of "no-man's land."
Counsel for Smith admits that Smith does not own it but
maintains that l\Jrs. DeNiro also does not own it, and
that the Court should have preserved it as a piece of "noman's land." This point has never heretofore been raised
in any court in this action. When the case was remanded
to the District Court, counsel for Smith submitted to the
Court two proposed amended descriptions. (See R. 5
and R. 103-105) In both proposals, :Mrs. DeNiro's ownership of the land south of Lot 42 was left undisturbed.
This matter was never even considered by the District
Court because it has never heretofore been raised.
Smith's whole argument in the District Court as shown
by R. 5 and R. 103-105 was to cut down Mrs. DeNiro's
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ownership in Lots 40 and 41 so that she would receive a
smaIIer portion of those Lots than was shown by Smith's
own Exhibit 1-P. The Court signed the amendments to
the Decree submitted by counsel for Mrs. DeNiro which
foilowed along the line shown on Exhibit 1-P.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN QUIETING TITLE IN MRS. DENIRO TO THE AREA
SOUTH OF LOT 42.
The District Court correctly foilowed the mandate
of this Court. Smith now contends that the Court should
not have quieted title to the area south of Lot 42 in Mrs.
DeNiro. There are three short but cogent reasons why
the District Court did not err in quieting title to the land
south of Lot 42, outside the Smith subdivision, in Mrs.
DeNiro. They are:
l. The question of ownership of the area south of

Lot 42 has never been raised by either party in this case
prior to now. Smith should not now be ailowed to make
it an issue. When this action was originally tried in the
District Court, plaintiff Smith claimed only the area
within the subdivision he had platted into lots and recorded. He had included part of the mill race in these
lots. Smith prevailed at the trial and the Court allowed
counsel for Smith to draw the Findings and Decree, and
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the Court thereafter signed them exactly as he had
drawn them. In those Findings and Decree, counsel for
Smith, at the east end of the mill race, followed along
the south line of Lot 42. He made no claim to anything
south of Lot 42 in the trial Court. Counsel himself provided in the Findings and Decree that everything south
of Lot 42 should be and was quieted in DeNiro. (See
Paragraph 2 of Decree, R. 69) When DeNiro appealed
to this Court it was concerning only Lots 40, 41 and the
small southwest corner of Lot 42. (See Page 2 of DeNiro'.s original Brief on Appeal). Had Smith been dissatisfied with the Decree which his counsel drew, he
could have cross appealed, but he did not. He was satisfied with it at that point.
Upon appeal and upon rehearing, this Court held
that DeNiro should have been given the south part of
Lots 40 and 41 and the corner of Lot 42. This Court said
nothing about the area south of Lot 42 because neither
party had made it an issue in any court. When the case
was remanded to the District Court to amend the Findings and Decree, counsel for both parties submitted proposed amendments. In the motion to amend Decree submitted by Smith's counsel, (See R. 5) he did not attempt
in any way to disturb or change Mrs. DeNiro's ownership of the area south of Lot 42. His description, which
he tried to pursuade the Court to sign did not deviate
from the original line running along the south side of
Lot 42 which he had inserted into the original Decree.
His whole contention in the District Court was that his
own Exhibit I as it pertained to Lots 40 and 41 should
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not be followed and more evidence should be taken. The
court refused his request.
Now, in this Court, nine years after he filed his
action and two years after trial, Smith for the first time
questions DeNiro having title quieted in her to the area
south of Lot 42. Obviously piqued by his losses in the
south end of Lots 40 and 41, he now seeks to disturb her
ownership of the property south of and outside the subdivision which he platted years ago and recorded. Smith
frankly admits he does not own the area south of Lot 42,
but urges that it should be maintained as a "no-man's
land." This claim comes much too late. We are in this
Court for the third time, and he cannot now bring in new
claims which he has never asserted before. This case
must end someday but it never will if either party is
allowed to assert new claims at his pleasure. This Court
has in many decisions refused to allow new claims to be
presented on appeal which were not presented below.
The rules should especially be invoked where we are now
in our third hearing in this Court.
2. This Court in its opinion on rehearing directed

the District Court to draw the line between the parties
following Exhibit l, which was Smith's own survey plat.
This plat drawn by Smith's engineers gave to Smith
everything embraced within his Deed from James H.
Park in October, 1946. This Court found no acquiescence and hence restricted Smith to his deed description. Said this Court:
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"The courses and distances are set out in the
conveyance under which the plaintiff claims and
are depicted in Exhibit I, which is a map of the
area offered in evidence by the plaintiff. The
description and the deed as outlined on the Exhibit clearly shows that plaintiff's boundary is
to the north of the location of the abandoned
mill race ... We are therefore of the opinion
that the trial court erred in determining that the
plaintiff's southerly boundary was a line running
generally along the south bank of the Gordon
Mill Race."
The amendments entered by the District Court follow the line drawn by Smith's own surveyor in Exhibit
I. Everything north of the survey line was quieted in
Smith and everything south of the survey line was quieted in Mrs. DeNiro. If Smith disagreed with this Court's
opinion on rehearing, he should have then petitioned for
further rehearing. He did not do so. He cannot now
under the guise of a new appeal complain and attempt
to reargue matters put to rest by that opinion on rehearing. This court should summarily dismiss his contentions.
3. Smith admits that he does not own the area south
of Lot 42 and that it could not be quieted in him, (See
Page 7 of Smith's Brief) but asserts there that "third
parties have interest therein which should not be adjudged or prejudiced by this amended Decree." The
answer to that contention is that no party is prejudiced
by this amended Decree. This Court recognized that
principal in its opinion on rehearing. It said: "The record does not disclose whether or not the claim of defend-
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ant (DeNiro) is good as against all of the world; nevertheless, it would appear that her claims of ownership are
superior to the plaintiff's claim to the disputed area.''
Certainly there was never any attempt by this Court to
shut the door on claims of third parties. They may still
be presented.
This law suit was filed by Smith in 1963. Now, nine
years later, Smith suggests that there may be some
phantom claimants which might be prejudiced by this
Decree. Certainly if such phantom claimants do exist,
they would have come forward by now. This argument is
obviously without merit and smacks of "dog-in-themanger."
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR
WITH RESPECT TO THE DRAINAGE EASEMENT.
In the original Decree quieting title, Smith was
ordered to provide for Mrs. DeNiro a drainage easement
generally falling along the bottom of the old mill race.
This, of course, as a low point and a point where the
water would naturally run. Smith now complains that
since DeNiro has been awarded ownership of the bed of
the mill race through Lots 40 and 41, the drain ditch
should run through her property at that point and not
Smiths. We do not disagree with this contention, but
think that the Decree as written so provides this. Because
of the topography of the land, the drain water will con-
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tinue to run to the bottom of the mill race irrespective of
who may own it. DeNiro has never made claim for any
easement north of the mill race. DeNiro would have to
make water run up hill to make it run north of the mill
race. This matter, like other matters raised by Smith in
this appeal, was not raised in the District Court. We believe, however, from reading the original Decree quieting title that the true meaning and intent is that the drainage easement would be provided along the bottom of the
old mill race. This is the level which the water would
naturally seek. Since now part of the mill race through
Lots 40 and 41 belong to Mrs. DeNiro, the drain water
would run on her own property through these lots. It
could not be forced to run on the high ground lying north
of the mill race which is owned by Smith in Lots 40 and
41. The drainage ditch would have to run on a relatively
straight course and could not make sharp bends around
lot corners. We believe that there is no problem with
the Decree quieting title in this rsepect. We believe that
a fair and reasonable interpretation of
language requires that the drainage ditch be established at the low
point at the bottom of the old mill race.
CONCLUSION
Smith should not now be permitted to raise new
matters for the first time. Ownership of the land south
of Lot 42 has never been an issue in this lawsuit or
appeal. In the original decree it was given to Mrs.
DeN iro since Smith laid no claim to it. He has no title

to it. The only land involved in the appeal to this court
was Lots 40, 41 and a corner of Lot 42. The appeal
should not now be expanded to encompass new issues
not heretofore raised. Smith could have cross-appealed
any portion of the original Decree which aggrieved him.
He did not do so and his complaint to this Court now
comes too late.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD C. HOWE
Attorney for Defendant,
Mary Ann DeNiro
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